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Constitutional Law-EQUAL PROTECTION-DUE
PROCESSTHEIRREBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION
DOCTRINE-Weinberger u. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749 (1975).
Appellee Concetta Salfi married Londo Salfi in May 1972.
Although in apparent good health a t the time of the marriage,
Londo suffered a fatal heart attack 6 months later. Concetta then
applied to the Social Security Administration for widow's insurance benefits and for child's insurance benefits for her daughter
by a previous marriage. Both applications were denied for the
reason that section 416 of the Social Security Act1 excludes from
receipt of benefits surviving wives and stepchildren who had been
related to the deceased wage earner for less than 9 months prior
to his death.
Concetta and her daughter then filed an action in district
court challenging the constitutionality of section 416. A threejudge district court certified the case as a class action, found the
duration-of-relationship requirements to constitute irrebuttable
presumptions which violated the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and granted declaratory and injunctive relief and
darn age^.^ The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
duration-of-relationship requirements were not irrebuttable presumptions in violation of due process; rather, treating the claim
as founded upon the equal protection clause, the Court found that
the requirements were valid since they were rationally related to
a legitimate legislative ~ b j e c t i v e . ~
-

-

1. 42 U.S.C. § 416(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974) defines "widow" as "the surviving wife of
an individual, but only if . . . (5) she was married to him for a period of not less than
nine months immediately prior to the day on which he died . . . ." 42 U.S.C. 9 416(e)(2)
(Supp. IV, 1974) defines "child" as "(2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for. . .
(if the insured individual is deceased) not less than nine months immediately preceeding
the day on which such individual died . . . ."
2. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 965-66 (N.D. Cal. 1974), reu'd, 422 U.S. 749
(1975).
3. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777, 780-81 (1975). The Court first treated the
jurisdiction issue, finding jurisdiction over the claims raised by Concetta and her daughter, but not over the class action. Id. a t 756-67. The district court, 373 F. Supp. at 966,
based jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), which confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts to hear claims arising under the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, read
9 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970), as precluding federal
jurisdiction under § 1331 to hear constitutional challenges to the Act. According to the
majority, any constitutional challenge to the Act arises under the Act and is subject to
the requirements of § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, which requires exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Since none of the class members had even applied to the Administrator for such remedies, the Court dismissed the class claim. With respect to the named
appellees who had a t least applied, however, the Court found that further administrative
exhaustion would be fruitless since the Administrator could not decide their only claim,
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Legislation creates an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption%hen it provides that fact A (the basic fact) is conclusive
evidence of the existence of fact B (the presumed f a c t ) . T h e
practical effect of a conclusive presumption is to make fact B
irrelevant: when a statute conditions a benefit upon a presumed
fact (B) which follows directly upon proof of a basic fact (A), the
benefit is actually conditioned solely upon proof of the basic fact
( A ).' Since the legislature intended to condition the benefit upon
fact B,' courts have required that the presumption be factually
which was the constitutionality of the Act. Thus, the Court found two parts to the exhaustion of remedies requirements of 42 U.S.C. 8 405(g) (1970). First, it absolutely required
that the Administrator be given an opportunity to fashion an administrative remedy. The
class claim failed this first requirement. Second, it required exhaustion of administrative
remedies, which requirement may be waived by the Administrator or by the Court if it
appears that such exhaustion would be fruitless. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 44 U.S.L.W.
4224, 4226-27 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976).
The majority's interpretation of 5 205(h) of the Social Security Act was probably illfounded, as the dissent argues, 422 U.S. a t 789-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (holding that a challenge to a statute's constitutionality arises not under the statute, but under the Constitution). But see Mathews v.
Eldridge, 44 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4227 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976) (following Salfi).
4. The terms "irrebuttable presumption" and "conclusive presumption" are interchangeable. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Rebuttable presumptions are evidentiary devices that merely shift the burden of
proof. See 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
5 2490 (3d ed. 1940). Irrebuttable presumptions are
generally considered by commentators as rules of substantive law rather than rules of
EVIDENCE
5 1353 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); Brosman,
evidence. See id. 5 2492; 4 J . WIGMORE,
The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL.L. REV.17, 24 (1930). Courts, however, have not agreed
upon whether the irrebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence or a rule of law. See cases
cited in Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN.L. REV.449, 462
n.69 (1975). Compare Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) and Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973) with Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974) and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
5. 4 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
5 1353 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). For example, a statute
providing that any gift of a material part of a decedent's estate made within 6 years of
the decedent's death shall be construed to have been made in contemplation of death
creates a conclusive presumption. After proof of the basic fact (that a gift was made within
6 years of death), the presumed fact (that the gift was made in contemplation of death)
is conclusively inferred. The example is taken from Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230
(1926) (invalidating the presumption).
5 2492 (3d Ed. 1940).
EVIDENCE
6. 9 J . WIGMORE,
7. Some legislation creating conclusive presumptions sets out the presumed fact or
legislative purpose in the legislation itself. Mortmain statutes, such as the one described
in note 5 supra, are good examples. For most legislation, however, the Court must discover
or hypothesize a purpose. For example, a statute requiring all motorists to signal before
turning may be found to have automotive safety as its purpose. The statute can be
attacked for creating an irrebuttable presumption since it conclusively presumes that
turning without signaling is unsafe. The presumption is counterfactual and the classification overinclusive since a t a deserted corner a signal would not make a turn any safer.
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precise or that the classification created by the basic fact be
coterminous with that created by the presumed fact.
Irrebuttable presumptions based upon imprecise classifications have been found by the Supreme Court to violate the due
. ~ constitutional standard recently articulated
process c l a u ~ eThe
by the Court is that if it is not "necessarily or universally true in
fact" that the presumed fact follows from the basic fact, and
there exist "reasonable alternative means of making the crucial
determination," then the irrebuttable presumption denies due
process of law.9

A. Early Development of the Irrebuttable Presumption
Doctrine
In the 1920's and 1930's' the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was used by the Court to strike down classifications in the
tax laws.I0Because of the doctrine's substantive due process overAlmost all legislative classifications are imprecise if the purpose of the legislation is drawn
narrowly enough. If the purpose in the example is found to be broader-automotive safety,
certainty of application, ease of administration-imprecision would be more difficult to
find. In Salfi, 422 U.S. a t 776-77, Justice Rehnquist draws the congressional purpose to
include efficiency of administration.
Both the equal protection doctrine and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine evaluate the fit between means and purpose, making the judicial evaluation of legislative
purpose extremely important. On the problems of determining legislative purpose see
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 SUP.CT. REV.95, 115-31; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALEL.J. 1205,1212-23 (1970); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.L. REV.1, 43-47 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther,
Newer Equal Protection]; Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV.L. REV.1, 5-6 (1973); Note,
Of Classifications and Presumptions: The Social Security Act and the Illegitimate Child,
43 U.M.K.C.L. REV.248, 252 (1974); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal
Protection, 82 YALEL.J. 123, 128-38, 154 (1972).
8. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U.S. 312 (1932).
9. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S . 441, 452 (1973).
10. A typical case is Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), in which the Court
invalidated a federal estate tax provision that any gift in excess of $5,000 made within 2
years of the donor's death would be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death
and included in the donor's estate. The Court stated:
[Wlhether . . . the . . . presumption be treated as a rule of evidence or of
substantive law, it constitutes an attempt, by legislative fiat, to enact into
existence a fact which here does not, and cannot be made to exist in actuality
. . . .This Court has held more than once that a statute creating a presumption
which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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tones," however, it inspired criticism from both on12and off3the
Court. Later holdings by the Court attempted to restrict the doctrine's impact." With the general repudiation of substantive due
process review,15 the irrebuttable presumption doctrine became
almost entirely dormant" until after 1965, when it again appeared
as a means of invalidating classificatory legislation.17
Id. a t 329; see Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U.S. 352 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926); Note, The Right to Rebut: Conclusive Presumptions in Civil
Cases, 6 CONN.L. REV.725, 726-28 (1974).
11. Although couched in procedural due process terms of a right to present evidence
rebutting a presumption, it is clear that the challenge in most irrebuttable presumption
claims is a substantive due process challenge to the legislature's authority to condition
benefits or burdens upon the chosen criteria. Compare Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. a t 463,
467-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) with id. a t 455 (Marshall, J., concurring). Claimants
in such cases do not argue that they are incorrectly classified according to the law, but
that the law itself incorrectly classifies. They are, therefore, seeking a restraint on legislative abuse. Cf. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 332-51 (1932) (Stone, J., dissenting);
Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 218-21 (1931) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schlesinger
v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., 39 HARV.L. REV.1096 (1926); 41 YALEL.J. 906 (1932); 35 YALEL.J. 1011
(1926).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (presumption
found to be a declaration of legislative findings or a rule of law); Helvering v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935) (presumption sustained as necessary to prevent tax
avoidance); United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (-1934) (preference for
finding presumption rebuttable rather than conclusive).
15. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 534-37 (1949).
16. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543-44 (1942), Chief Justice Stone, in a
concurring opinion, apparently would have preferred the irrebuttable presumption doctine
over the equal protection doctrine used by the majority to invalidate the legislation. The
doctrine was only vaguely implicit in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11(1961) (invalidating
presumption that Communist party member shares unlawful aims of organization if he
joined or remained a member after swearing allegiance to Constitution); Slochower v.
Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (invalidating presumption of disloyalty when
a city employee failed to testify before a legislative hearing); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U S . 183 (1952) (invalidating disloyalty presumption for members of certain organizations).
17. In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,96-97 (1965), a provision of the Texas constitution that denied voting residency status to all United States servicemen who were not
originally Texas residents was invalidated for violating the equal protection clause. But
the Court also observed, id. a t 96, that the provision created an irrebuttable presumption
similar to that found in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), one of the tax cases of
the substantive due process era, discussed in note 10 supra. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971), involved a Georgia statute that required automatic suspension of vehicle registration and driver's license for any uninsured motorist involved in an accident who did not
post bond for the accident damage. The Court found the purpose of the statute to be the
protection of faultless accident victims from judgment-proof defendants and held that
fault could not be conclusively presumed since due process required a hearing on fault
before suspension of a license. Id. a t 540.
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B. Recent Cases Employing the Irrebuttable Presumption
Doctrine
The 1972 case of Stanley u. I1linoislRinvolved an equal protection challenge to an Illinois statutory plan whereby illegitimate children automatically became wards of the state upon the
death of their mother; the unwed father was presumed to be an
unfit parent.lg The Court, apparently unwilling to base its decision solely upon the due process clause,20used both a due process
and an equal protection analysis. After stating that parental
rights are protected by due process guarantee^,^^ the Court discussed the conclusive presumption of parental unfitness and
found that it denied due process to unwed fathemZ2In addition,
since the presumption violated due process rights of unwed fathers but not married fathers, the Court found an equal protection violation.23
In Vlandis v. Kline,24the Court struck down a Connecticut
law that fixed a student's residency status as his residence at the
time of application for admission to the state university system.25
The students argued that the law created an irrebuttable presumption and claimed a constitutional right to rebut the nonresidency presumption with evidence of bona fide r e ~ i d e n c e The
.~~
IS. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
19. The Juvenile Court Act 5 1-14, [I9651 Ill. Laws 2586 (amended 1973) defined
parents as "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the
natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent." ILL.REV.STAT.
ch. 37, 5 702-1 (1973) provides that proceedings to make children wards of the state "may
be instituted . . . concerning boys and girls who are . . . dependent . . . ." Id. 5 702-5
defines dependent as "[tlhose who are dependent include any minor . . . (a) who is
without a parent, guardian or legal custodian . . . ."
20. The due process irrebuttable presumption claim was not developed by either the
courts or the parties in the state courts. Therefore, the Supreme Court was presented only
with an equal protection claim and felt somewhat constrained to stay within the pleadings. See 405 U.S. a t 659 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
21. 405 U.S. a t 651-52.
22. Id. a t 653-58.
23. Id. a t 649, 658. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, objected to the majority's use
of the strict scrutiny equal protection test as a safeguard for all "important" rights. The
rationale was apparently espoused by the majority to bring the decision within the pleadings. Id. at 660; see note 20 supra.
24. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
25. No. 5, 5 126(a)(2), [I9711 Conn. Pub. Acts 2237 (repealed 1973) provided that
an unmarried student was a nonresident if his legal address at any time during the year
prior to application for admission was outside the state. P 126(a)(3) provided that a
married student was a nonresident if his legal address at the time of application for
admission was outside of the state. 8 125(a)(5) provided that the classifications were
permanent as long as the student attended the university system.
26. 412 U.S. a t 445-46.
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Court stated that conclusive presumptions "have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clause" and were unconstitutional
unless "necessarily or universally true in fact."27 Since the residency presumption was not necessarily true, and other means of
determining residency were available to the state, the presumption violated the due process clause.28
The third case, United States Department of Agriculture v.
M ~ r r yinvolved
,~~
a challenge to section 5(b) of the Food Stamp
which presumed food stamp ineligibility for any household
that included a member over age 18 who had been claimed as a
dependent for the previous year by a taxpayer living in another
h o ~ s e h o l d The
. ~ ~ Court found that the purpose of the statute, to
assist the needy while preventing college students who were supported by their parents from receiving food stamps, was not rationally related to the tax deduction classification. Since the classification produced a presumption that was often contrary to fact,
it violated due
In Cleveland Board of Education v. L a F l e ~ rplaintiffs
,~~
challenged school board regulations that required pregnant school27. The Court stated:
In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is forbidden by
the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of
a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has
reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.
Id. a t 452. The standard as articulated in Vlandis is the strongest statement of the irrebuttable presumption test found in recent cases. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger
stated that the majority had transferred the compelling state interest test to due process
adjudication. Id. a t 460. Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that the Court was returning
to a doctrine with strong substantive due process overtones previously repudiated by the
Court. Id. a t 463, 467-68. Justice White concurred in the judgment, but would have used
Justice Marshall's sliding scale equal protection model to invalidate the challenged legislation. Id. a t 458-59.
28. Id. a t 452.
29. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
30. 7 U.S.C. 8 2014(b) (1970).
31. The section states in pertinent part:
Any household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes
by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall be ineligible
to participate in any food stamp program . . . during the tax period such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after expiration of such tax
period.
Id.
32. 413 U.S. a t 512, 514.
33. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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teachers to take leave without pay before reaching the fifth or
sixth month of pregnancy. Applying the conclusive presumption
analysis of Vlandis, the Court found that the purpose of the regulation was to keep unfit teachers out of the classroom and that
the rule conclusively presumed that every teacher who reaches
the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy is unfit to teach." The rule
thus created an imprecise classification that was not necessarily
true and which the Court would not uphold.
Each of these recent cases produced vigorous dissents.3sThe
dissenters argued that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was
improperly employed since the equal protection doctrine was
, ~ ~ the application of the irrebuttable premore a p p r ~ p r i a t ethat
sumption doctrine distorted the results that would have been
34. Two justifications for the rule were offered by the school board. First, by allowing
the board to know exactly when new teachers would be needed, the rule preserved the
continuity of the educational process. The Court found the rule to bear no rational relationship to such a goal. 414 U S . a t 640-43. The second asserted justification, that the rule
operated to keep unfit teachers out of the classroom, was struck down under the irrebuttable presumption test. Id. a t 643-48. Justice Powell found both justifications irrational
under equal protection standards. Id. a t 653 (Powell, J., concurring).
35. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented in Vlandis, Murry, and
LaFleur. Justices Rehnquist and Powell took no part in Stanley, but Chief Justice Burger
also dissented in that case. Justice Powell dissented in Murry and concurred only in the
result in LaFleur.
For a case in which the dissenters were in the majority see Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U S . 356 (1973), wherein a regulation promulgated to implement the Truth in Lending Act was challenged on irrebuttable presumption grounds. The
Federal Reserve Board had promulgated the Four Installment rule, 12 C.F.R. 226.2(k)
(1975 rev.) under authority of § 105 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
The rule required, among other things, the disclosure of cash price, the amount of finance
charges and other charges, and the rate of the charges on all installment contracts extending over 4 months. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 449 F.2d 235 (1971), held that the
Four Installment rule constituted an unconstitutional conclusive presumption since the
rule required truth in lending disclosures on any installment contract extending over 4
months whether it involved credit or not. The regulation therefore created a conclusive
presumption that all installment contracts extending over 4 months involved credit and
should be regulated. Since the presumption was often counterfactual and considerably
overinclusive, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the regulation. An alternate ground for the
decision was that the Federal Reserve Board overstepped the legislative grant of authority.
The Supreme Court reversed, adopting an equal protection approach, and found that
the rule
was intended as a prophylactic measure; it does not presume that all creditors
who are within its ambit assess finance charges, but, rather, imposes a disclosure requirement on all members of a defined class . . . .
411 U.S. a t 377 (1973). Whether the contracts involved credit was irrelevant to the Court
since the Court found a rule of substantive law rather than a conclusive evidentiary
presumption.
36. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S . 441, 460 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U S . 632,652 (Powell, J., concurring only in the result).
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produced by equal protection analysis,37and that the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine threatened to become "an engine of destruction for countless legislative judgment^."^^

C.

Welfare Legislation and the Equal Protection Clause

As the least specific and potentially the most expansive guarantees in the Constitution, the equal protection and due process
clauses lie at the roots of the debates over separation of powers
and judicial activism versus judicial restraint.39 Consequently,
the Supreme Court feels compelled to review equal protection
claims upon articulated neutral principle^.^^ Thus, before invalidating legislation under the equal protection banner, the Court
generally requires that the means employed by the legislature to
achieve a legitimate end be wholly irrational."' However, when
constitutionally protected fundamental rightsa are threatened or
suspect classification^^^ are used by the legislature, the Court
37. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S . 441, 459 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
38. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975); see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-59 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. a t 652 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S . 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW484-85 (9th
CASESAND MATERIALS
39. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER,
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;Dixon, The 'New' Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.
44-45.
40. The term "neutral principles" is used to mean constitutionally founded principles
that may be logically and justly applied to a wide range of factual situations with coherent
results. The search for neutral principles to guide Fourteenth Amendment review has
produced considerable comment. E.g., Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.89 [hereinafter cited as Barrett, A More Modest Role]; Dixon, The 'New' Substantive Due Process
and the Democratic Eth,ic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.43; Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ.L. REV.479 (1973); Gunther, Newer Equal
Protection, supra note 7; Nowak, Realigning the ~ t a n d d r d sof Review Under the Equal
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO.L.J.
1071 (1974); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV.CN. RIGHTS-CIV.
LIB. L. REV.269
(1975); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV.L. REV. 1 (1973); Wilkinson, The Supreme
Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61
CONST.
VA.L. REV.945 (1975); Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS
L.Q. 645 (1975).
41. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U S . 156,165-166 (1973); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U S . 483,488 (1955); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Barrett, A More Modest Role 92, 12229.
42. As used by the Court, "constitutionally protected rights" and "fundamental
rights" are synonymous terms, meaning those rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U S . 1,33-34 (1973).
The literature discussing the Court's treatment of the fundamental rights category is
massive. See, e.g., Barrett, A More Modest Role 91-92, 108-21.
43. See, e.g., Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More
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imposes a strict-and usually fatalu-scrutiny requiring compelling governmental justification^.^^
Although at one time the Court hinted that rights to welfare
payments might be fundamental rights,46it has since consistently
applied only minimal scrutiny and granted the legislature broad
In reviewing welfare
classifying powers in welfare legi~lation.~'
legislation that involves no suspect classification or fundamental
right, the Court's inquiry has been limited to whether a reasonable legislator could have rationally concluded that the particular
legislation would promote the desired objective?
The Supreme Court recently, but temporarily, departed from
this traditional deference, striking down welfare legislation in two
y~~
cases: United States Department of Agriculture v. M ~ r r and
Under the traditional equal protection
Jimenez v. Weinberge~~O
model, both would have evoked the rational basis or minimal
scrutiny test since neither case involved a fundamental right or
~~
the statute's rationality was
suspect c l a s s i f i ~ a t i o n .Although
discussed in Murry, the Court based its decision on the due process clause and applied a standard that approached the perfect
fit standard of V l a n d i ~In
. ~Jimenez,
~
the Court nominally applied
-

- -

Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.90-91, 93-108.
44. See Gunther, Newer Equal Protection 8.
45. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Gunther, Newer Equal
Protection 8-10.
46. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969); Barrett, A More Modest Role 105-06; Gunther, Newer
Equal Protection 8-10.
47. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school financing); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (aid t o families with dependent children);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (social security); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (aid to families with dependent children).
48. The Burger Court's retreat from the Warren Court's use of strict scrutiny review
to achieve a new social order has been criticized: "The philosopher kings are in the caves
and the new positivist justices are busy correlating means to ends with their rational basis
tools." 43 U.M.K.C.L. REV.248 (1974). On the other hand, it has been noted that interventionist use of strict scrutiny review as well as irrebuttable presumption review would
"mandate rule by legislatures composed of philosopher-kings, or if they cannot be found,
rule by federal district judges." Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the
Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.80.
49. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
50. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
51. In Jimenez, the Court struck down a scheme distributing social security benefits
inequitably between different groups of illegitimate children. Since the statute discriminated between classes of illegitimates, no suspect classification singling out illegitimates
as a class was involved. 417 U.S. a t 631-32, 635-36. The Murry majority based its holding
entirely upon the due process clause, disregarding potential equal protection issues of
fundamental rights or suspect criteria. 413 U.S. a t 509-514.
52. See 413 U.S. a t 514.
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the rational basis test. In reality, however, the Court employed
an unarticulated but clearly heightened standard of scrutiny requiring a nearly perfect means-ends r e l a t i ~ n s h i p . ~ ~
Although the Court has not extended fundamental right status t~ welfare and social security payments, it has, through the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine, applied a stricter standard to
such legislation than the traditional minimal scrutiny of equal
protection review. In other areas as well, the Court's dissatisfaction with two-tiered equal protection has produced strong
dissents54and aberrant results.55According to most commentat o r ~ the
, ~ deviations
~
are evidence that the Court is searching
for alternatives to the traditional model. Use of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine within the usual equal protection domain
is attributable to that search.

The district court, relying on Vlandis, Stanley, and LaFleur,
found section 416 to create an irrebuttable presumption that all
short-lived marriages are shams for the purpose of obtaining social security payments.57It found that the section's purpose was
to deny payments to those persons who married solely to obtain
53. See 417 U S . a t 636-37. In Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the Jimenez Court's
"perplexing three-legged stool" basis for decision, id. a t 638-41 (dissenting opinion), he
states:
The holding is clearly founded in notions of equal protection . . . . Yet the
opinion has strong due process overtones as well, at times appearing to pay
homage to the still novel, and I think insupportable, theory that "irrebuttable
presumptions" violate due process.
Id. a t 638.
54. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655-77 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-137 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 456-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
55. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandisv. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Some of these cases are reviewed in
the authorities cited in note 56 infra.
56. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER,
C O N S T ~ T I O NLAW
A L 661-63, 769-78, 875-76; Gunther,
Newer Equal Protection 12, 18-20; Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2
HASTINGS
CONST.L.Q. 645, 654,658-60 (1975); Comment, "Newer" Equal Protection: The
Impact of the Means-Focused Model, 23 BUFF.
L. REV. 665, 666-69 (1974). Note, The
Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975DUKEL.J. 163, 164,
170-77.
57. 373 F. Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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benefits.5RAlthough the legislative goal was legitimate, the 9month classification used by Congress was not a universally valid
indicator that the marriage had been entered into to obtain social
security benefits, and thus violated due process.5g
In reversing, the Supreme Court distinguished the three
cases relied on by the district court. Stanley and LaFleur were
characterized as involving fundamental rights requiring heightened scrutiny; Vlandis was distinguished on its factsY Then,
instead of applying the mechanical irrebuttable presumption
analysis employed by the district court, the Court applied the
minimal scrutiny equal protection standard traditionally used in
the economic and welfare areasY Relying on several "old"R2equal
protection cases,63the Court stated the test to be whether there
was some rational relation between the classification and a legitimate purpose.64Ignoring the degree of precision in the classification, which would have been a t issue in an irrebuttable presumption analysis, the Court determined that the classification had
the required rational basis.65 Consequently, the duration-ofrelationship requirements of section 416" were held to be constitutionally sound.

Almost any equal protection issue can be analyzed in irrebuttable presumption terms; likewise, most irrebutable presumption cases can be decided under equal protection analysis." Most
58. Id. The Social Security Act's legislative history supports this conclusion of the
district court. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1971); H.R. REP. NO.
544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1967); H.R. REP.NO. 2526, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946).
59. 373 F. Supp. at 965-66.
60. 422 U.S. a t 771-72. See notes 85-93 and accompanying text infra.
61. 422 U.S. a t 768-70, 772. In declining to treat welfare payments as fundamental
rights, the Court stated that "a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public
treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status." Id. at 772.
62. "Old" refers to the traditional minimal scrutiny without "bite," as opposed to
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW657-63;
"new" and "newer" equal protection. See G. GUNTHER,
Gunther, Newer Equal Protection 8-24.
63. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S.
61 (1913); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
64. 422 U.S. a t 777.
65. Id. a t 780-85.
66. Note 1 supra.
67. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARV.L. REV.1534, 1548 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis,
27 STAN.L. REV.449, 463-65 (1975).
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classificatory legislation distributes benefits or burdens unequally; thus, it is subject to an equal protection attack since the
distinction allocating the benefits or burdens may arguably be
irrational or invidious. Similarly, classificatory legislation creates
a conclusive presumption since possession of the classifying characteristic presumes inclusion in or exclusion from the class that
the legislature sought to affect. If the classifying characteristic
chosen by the legislature does not perfectly describe the target
group, the legislation may be attacked as violating the due process clause.6sThis doctrinal interchangeability produces problems related both to the interchange possibility itself and to the
analytical weaknesses of the doctrines involved.

A.

Problems Occasioned by the

Interchangeability of Doctrines
1.

Manipulation of outcome

Although either doctrine can be applied in a given case, the
choice often determines outcome. The perfect fit requirement of
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is much more demanding
than the equal protection minimal scrutiny test and probably is
a t least as demanding as the strict scrutiny test." A fundamental
right or suspect classification is necessary to raise the scrutiny
,~~
from minimal to strict in equal protection a n a l a y ~ i s whereas
conclusive presumption analysis never deals with the nature of
the interest affected (fundamental right) or the nature of the
criteria used to classify (suspect classification) since it looks only
to the degree of precision of the classification chosen in achieving
the legislative purpose. Thus, when cases such as Salfi7' present
a choice between the rational basis test of equal protection and
the exacting perfect fit test of the conclusive presumption doctrine, courts determine outcome when they select the doctrine to
apply. The result is that unprincipled doctrinal choices effect
decisions on the equities.
68. See notes 4-9 and accompanying text supra.
69. Cf. note 89 infra.
70. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra.
71. Jimenez and Murry also involved economic legislation, allowing the Court to
choose between the traditional minimal scrutiny and the perfect fit test of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine. Given the choice, the Court avoided minimal scrutiny in Jimenez
and Murry. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra.
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2. Manipulation of remedy

The interchange possibility also allows courts to control the
remedy to be granted. When an equal protection attack succeeds,
the court invalidates the l e g i s l a t i ~ nIf
. ~the
~ court finds that the
statute creates a n unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption,
however, the usual result is an individualized hearing to determine whether the statutory classification accurately reflects the
legislative purpose as applied to the claimant. In effect, the presumption becomes rebuttable .73
Scholars disagree on the effectiveness of individualized hearings in guaranteeing individual rights. One commentator views
the individualized hearing remedy as a tool that can effectively
nullify legislative policy choices; requiring the extreme procedural burden of an individualized hearing may render certain
In contrast, another scholar
legislation impossible to adrnini~ter.'~
considers the individualized hearing to be a hollow remedy since
the onerous law remains in force, subject only to a hearing in
which the individual bears the burden of showing that none of the
conceivable purposes of the statute apply in his case.75A court
could, therefore, thwart vindication of individual rights by granting the illusory remedy of an individualized hearing to plaintiffs
who successfully prosecute irrebuttable presumption claims.
3. Evasion of significant equal protection issues

The irrebuttable presumption doctrine is an inadequate substitute for the equal protection doctrine. Besides distorting the
outcome that may have been reached under an equal protection
72. Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine,
7 IND.L. REV.644, 646-47 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine].
73. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S . 441, 445-46 (1973); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542
(1971). The individualized hearing remedy is awarded in irrebuttable presumption cases
since the doctrine speaks in evidentiary and procedural due process terms. See note 11
supra. What is sought through the individualized hearing is an exception to the statute.
But even a judicial finding that legislation violates procedural due process does not result
in specific exemptions from legislation; rather, due process requires a hearing to determine
only whether the complainant is accurately classified according to the law. If so, no
exemption is granted. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U S . 254, 267 (1970). Moreover, legislation
attacked under the due process void-for-vagueness doctrine, which requires certainty in
statutory definition of proscribed conduct and result, cannot be saved through individualized hearings. Such legislation must be redrafted until it gives sufficient notice as required
by due process. See Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine 654-55 & n.31; Note, The Void-forVagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.67 (1960).
74. Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.79-80.
75. Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine 655-58, 660.
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analy~is,~
the
' mechanical application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine permits the court to evade significant equal
protection issues. This is the most serious problem caused by the
interchangeability of the two doctrines. The recent Supreme
Court cases decided on conclusive presumption grounds were
equally susceptible to equal protection review; each would have
forced the Court to confront significant questions regarding the
breadth of fundamental rights and suspect classes.77The question
the Court should be pursuing is not whether the case involves an
irrebuttable presumption or equal protection claim, but whether
the legislature constitutionally may so affect the individual rights
a t stake. This requires an analysis of the importance and extent
of deprivation of the individual's interests weighed against the
state's interests in enacting the classificatory legislation. Such an
analysis is required by the equal protection doctrine, but veiled
by the irrebuttable presumption doctrine.78

B.

The Impact of Salfi on the Irrebuttable Presumption
Doctrine

In Salfi, by finding the challenged legislation subject only to
a minimal scrutiny equal protection test instead of an irrebuttable presumption test, the Court has restricted the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine's application. Both the Court's intention to
limit the doctrine and the extent of the limitation are evident
from the Court's characterization of the previous irrebuttable
presumption cases.
According to the Court's characterization of Stanley and
LaFleur, those cases required a heightened standard of review
because they respectively involved the fundamental rights to
"conceive and to raise one's children" and "personal choice in
76. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
77. Basing the decisions on the due process clause and and using conclusive presumption analysis, the Court avoided the illegitimate and sex-based classification issues in
Stanley, the sex-based classification issue in LaFleur, the right-to-travel and right-toeducation issues in Vlandis, and the right-to-basic-sustenanceissue in Murry. These are
substantial issues with which the Court has previously struggled but which may still be
in flux. A discussion of Stanley, LaFleur, Vlandis, and Murry and the issues avoided in
each can be found in Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine 648-51.
78. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U S . 632, 651-52 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Murry illustrates his agreement with Professor
Wigmore that there are no true conclusive evidentiary presumptions; such devices are
substantive rules of law. Justice Rehnquist states: "Thus we deal not with the law of
evidence, but with the extent to which the Fifth Amendment permits this Court to invalidate such a determination by Congress." 413 U S . a t 524. Compare id. with 4 J. WIGMORE,
5 1353 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
§ 2492 (3d Ed. 1940).
EVIDENCE
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matters of marriage and family life."7g Actually, although the
Court in Stanley had indicated that parental rights were of such
significance that they were protected by due process guarantee^,^^
the heightened standard of equal protection review arose, not
from fundamental parental rights, but from the right not to be
denied due process when an important interest is at stake?
Moreover, the body of the Court's opinion in Stanley concerned
the statutory conclusive presumption, which the Court found repugnant to the due process clause.82In LaFleur, the issue of the
nature of the right involved, which determines the standard of
equal protection analysis, was entirely evaded through the use of
the irrebuttable presumption doctrineeS3
To distinguish Vlandis, the Court stated that Vlandis held
that
where Connecticut purported to be concerned with residency, it
might not a t the same time deny to one seeking to meet its test
of residency the opportunity to show factors clearly bearing on
that issue .u4

As the dissent points
however, the Salfi situation can be
characterized in exactly the same language if "marriage validity"
is substituted for "residency" in the above quotation.
By redefining the recent irrebuttable presumption cases as
involving strict scrutiny,86the Court has a t least limited the irre79. 422 U.S. a t 771.
80. 405 U.S. a t 651.
81. The Court reasoned that parental interests were important interests protected by
due process. Since the statute granted due process rights only to married fathers, i t
discriminated against unmarried fathers by denying them the fundamental right to due
process and was subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Id. a t 658;
see notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
82. 405 U.S. a t 652-58.
83. 414 U.S. a t 644-46, 651. The Court found personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life to be one of the liberties protected by the due process clause, id. a t 63940, but did not analyze the issues in equal protection language.
84. 422 U.S. a t 771. The Court used essentially the same approach in a later discussion of Vlandis, id. a t 772.
85. 422 U.S. a t 803 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reasoned: "The defintions of 'resident' were precisely parallel to the statute here, which defines 'widow' and
'child' in part by the number of months of marriage . . . ." Id.
86. See notes 79-85 and accompanying text supra for the Court's characterizations
of Stanley, LaFleur, and Vlandis. Murry was distinguished as involving legislation not
even meeting the lower tier equal protection standard of rationality. 422 U.S. a t 772.
Murry, however, was not decided on the basis of the equal protection minimal scrutiny
test, but on the basis of the due process clause. 413 U.S. a t 514; see Lavine v. Milne, 44
U.S.L.W. 4295, 4298 n.9 (U.S.Mar. 3, 1976) (citing Murry as a conclusive presumption
case). In either event, it is certainly arguable that denying food stamps to one who is a
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buttable presumption doctrine and the attendant individualized
hearing remedy to only those cases involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights. In fact, the restriction may be more
severe than that, sincedhe procrustean attempt to fit the recent
irrebuttable presumption cases into the traditional equal protection framework, especially when the fit is so strained, displays the
Court's strong desire to return to equal protection analysis in such
cases.
In light of the problems encountered in applying the concluthe return to exclusive use of the
sive presumption do~trine,~'
equal protection doctrine in these cases would be a welcome shift.
As a result of Salfi, difficult equal protection questions which
have evaded review through the application of conclusive presumption analysis must now be treated by the
Unprincipled decisions on the equities, which the interchangeability between doctrines and the formulary application of irrebuttable
presumption analysis allowed, will now be restricted.

C. The Impact of Salfi on the Equal Protection Doctrine
As previously noted, the Court's description of Stanley and
LaFleur as involving fundamental rights implies that irrebuttable presumption analysis may be appropriate in strict scrutiny
situations. If that is the case, the Court, given the facility of
finding conclusive presumptions in most legislation, will be faced
dependent of another is a t least as rational as denying social security death benefits to a
surviving spouse married less than 9 months prior to the death of the partner.
Bell, Carrington, and Stanley have sometimes been cited as involving the equal
protection clause: Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 457-58 (1973) (White, J., concurring);
id. a t 461 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 (1975). They
are also cited as based on the due process clause: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 645 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514
(1973).
87. See notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra; Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine;
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV.L. REV.
1534 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN.L. REV.449
(1975). But see Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures:
Learning From Nature's Future, 84 YALEL.J. 545 (1975), arguing that individual determinations are useful to promote the formation of a new social consensus regarding the values
underlying challenged legislation when those values are in flux. Professor Tribe approves
of Stanley and LaFleur because they involved legislation based on outdated moral values
which were yet evolving. By requiring individualized hearings, the Court achieved personalized justice in settings of widely perceived moral flux and contributed to the establishment of a new social consensus. I t is emphasized that the governmental agency controlling
the decisionmaking was in a position to prevent the emergence of a new social consensus.
Id. a t 554-55.
88. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.

5651

CASE NOTES

581

with selecting between the "necessarily true" and "compelling
state interest" standards as well as determining which remedy,
individualized hearings or invalidation, would be more appropriate. Although the existence of a significant difference between the
, ~ ~ difference between the two
two standards is q u e s t i ~ n a b l e the
remedies may be s u b ~ t a n t i a l . ~ ~
Salfi has also affected the lower tier of equal protection analysis. In three recent pre-Salfi casesg1in the food stamp and social
security areas, the Court applied three different standards of
scrutiny, each more demanding than the minimal scrutiny standard usually applied.g2In light of those cases and the pre-Salfi
acceptance of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, one comthe viability of the minimal scrutiny tradimentatorg~uestioned
tion in the welfare area. By refusing to follow the recent deviations from the model, however, the Salfi Court retreated from
stricter equal protection review of welfare legislation. The Salfi
opinion, while undermining the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, also indicates that the level of minimal scrutiny for welfare
89. In Vlandis, the Court tempered the perfect fit requirement by emphasizing the
availability of reasonable alternative means of making the factual determination presumed by the statute. 412 U.S. at 451-52. While not requiring a perfect fit between means
and ends, the compelling state interest test does require that the state use the means that
are least burdensome to the rights affected. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 267, 269 (1974). The two tests may, therefore, be very close, since if a legislature
creates a conclusive presumption when reasonable alternatives means for making the
factual determination are available, it has obviously not chosen the means least burdensome to the affected rights.
90. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra; cf. Tribe, Structural Due Process,
10 HARV.CIV.RIGHTS-CIV.
LIB. L. REV.269, 303-10 (1975) (individualized decisionmaking
would be preferred when the legislation's underlying values are in flux and when the
enforcing governmental body is in a position to prevent the emergence of an alternative
social consensus); Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures:
Learning from Nature's Future, 84 YALE.L.J. 545,552-55 (1975) (approving of Stanley and
LaFleur); note 87 supra.
91. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the Court held that it was a
denial of equal protection to provide social security benefits to surviving children and a
surviving wife if an insured husband died, whereas if an insured wife died, only the
surviving children received survivors' benefits. Without reaching the issue of whether the
sex-based classification was suspect, the Court scrutinized the offered justifications for the
distinction and found them insufficient. The presumption of validity normally given legislation under minimal scrutiny review apparently was not employed.
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) is reviewed in notes 50, 51, 53 and
accompanying text supra.
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) is reviewed in notes
28-31, 49, 51, 52, 86 and accompanying text supra.
LAW 774-75 (reviewing
92. See note 91 supra; G. GUNTHER,CONSTITUTIONAL
Wiesenfield), 849 (reviewing Murry), 872-74 (reviewing Jimenez), 891 (reviewing Murry).
93. Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine 653 n.27.
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legislation may return to the near nonscrutiny of "old" equal
protection. For example, t h e Court states:
[Tlhe question raised is not whether a statutory provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual
position which generated the congressional concern . . . . Nor
is the question whether the provision filters out a substantial
part of the class . . . or whether it filters out more members of
the class than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress
. . . could rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and
that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rulesg4

The majority's censure of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
is clear. However, the Court strains the definition of "rational"
when it suggests that a classification that fails more than it succeeds in defining the desired class may be upheld as rational.g5
While it has not produced perfect order from chaos, the restriction of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine in Salfi should
produce added clarity in equal protection review since the Court
can no longer retreat from difficult equal protection analysis via
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. At the same time, however, it is unfortunate that the province of strict scrutiny is now
overcrowded with two tests and remedies, and that manipulation
of the rationality standard continues as the norm in minimal
scrutiny review.
94. 422 U.S. at 777.
95. The pliability of the definition of "rational" is unsettling, especially when the
Court determines rationality in reference to a legislative purpose selected by the Court.
See note 7 supra. Compare Salfi (extreme deference to the legislature) with In re Estate
of Cavill, 329 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1974) (finding a statute that was overinclusive and underinclusive as the terms are used in irrebuttable presumption analysis to be irrational, thereby
failing "minimal" equal protection scrutiny); cf. Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in
Constitutional Adjudication: Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the
CONST.
L.Q.
Establishment of a Viable Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS
153,161-71 (1975); Note, Legislative Purposes, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE
L.J. 123, 154 (1972).

